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Universities
     Introduction
The simplest rationale for the existence of a publicly funded university is that it provides
some form of public good. If all the outputs of a university were privately owned, and pri-
vately appropriable, there would be no need for public funding. Either firms would fund
the research and training which could be internalized by themselves, or students could
fund the teaching through higher future earnings. Consequently, one way to pose the is-
sue of the future role of universities is to ask what public goods they can provide that can-
not be provided in other ways.
There are many possible types of answers to this question, and different answers re-
ceive emphasis at different moments in history. Over most of the modern period, though,
we can observe one function of the universities that has been dominant, and ongoing, last-
ing until some time in the twentieth century. In The University in Ruins, Bill Readings
coins the phrase “the university of culture”. Readings argues that the modern university
system builds directly on the writings of Humbolt and the German Idealists who were
very explicit about the social role of the university.   The argument is that universities are
uniquely placed to provide a sense of national culture. By studying and teaching the social
and cultural history of a nation, this culture is extended through time. Where this is val-
uable, and how we can see this as a public good, is in the way it conditions the citizens of
a nation. The teaching function of this university creates graduates who are all steeped in
the same cultural tradition, at least within one nation-state. They have a common view
regarding their social and cultural roots; they share a world view; if the university is work-
ing well, the graduates fit well into the existing society, and can further its aims in the fu-
ture. All of this has clear advantages socially, administratively and economically. In this
tradition of course, the humanities take a central place in the university structure, as they
are the repository of social culture that is so important in this sort of cultural extension. 
Historically, this has been extremely important, and is very apparent in the German
case. To create a single nation out of a collection of provinces, it is necessary to create a
national identity to which all citizens can relate. Without this common view, or social1
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      bond, there is no reason that citizens of one province will feel any obligation or allegiance
to citizens of any other. Without this, a nation cannot exist. To this end, a “tradition”
must be created, or found, and expounded, and to the extent that all students are taught
or exposed to the same tradition, an identity will emerge. If this identity is strong, grad-
uates will be “good citizens”, able to function well, achieve their ends, and still contribute
effectively to the greater good. In the European context, within a nation (with some ob-
vious exceptions) by and large this tradition has been a tradition of a literature, written in
a particular language. Literature is social commentary, description or analysis, and the lit-
erature of one language provides the basis of description of a single culture.1 
One can see a parallel here, as Readings points out, between the university of culture
and a national airline. Until recently, Air France has probably been the best remaining ex-
ample. Why does Air France still exist? Definitely not because it has produced great fi-
nancial profits for its owners.2 Air France still exists (as is the case with so many French
institutions) as an extension of French culture. Externally, it shows French technological
prowess; French styles of service; French cuisine (perhaps). It is a means of projecting the
French presence, and here this must mean cultural presence, since as an economic endeav-
our it cannot be said to be an unqualified success. Within France, it plays a closely related
role. “Projecting” is not quite the right word in the internal context, but perhaps “adver-
tising” is. Air France serves to remind the French citizen of French technological prowess
and so on, as it does to the outside world. But in addition, it serves as a vital means by
which all French citizens are linked to all others. It is a tool of cohesion. Flying unprofit-
able internal routes does not pay for Air France the company, but it does pay for Air
France the promoter of French culture. And here is the public good that has been consid-
ered so valuable. The value this provides is to bind the French together (in a very old-fash-
ioned way) which provides benefits throughout the society and polity, and, it is crucial to
point out, to other French industries. On the latter point, consider the “irrational” loyalty
the French have to their wine industry. (Though to be fair, one does occasionally hear a
French citizen admit that there might be one or two Italian wines worth drinking.) And
because this public good is considered so valuable, Air France has been protected for the
economic sphere. Just as, historically, the universities have been. 
The university of culture did provide economic benefits, through creating a cadre of
administrators who shared a coherent view of the world, and so were able to create policy
1. Philosophy is the other discipline that looms large in this university, as it is a discipline that
explicitly examines “how to live”, which is clearly a central question in the “soul” of a culture.
2. The situation of Air France has changed since 1993 when it received a 2 billion pound subsidy
from the French government: it no longer enjoys this sort of protection.2
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   with at least an over-arching coherence, and it created a cadre of managers whose view fit
well with that of the policy makers. The most explicit exemplar here are the French
(again) Grandes Ecoles, which have provided generation after generation of administra-
tors and managers who all had a common goal (the furtherance of French prestige, rough-
ly speaking) and common views both about the value of that goal and about how to
achieve it in the broadest senses. But this is all clearly a public good. It is a benefit that is
not appropriable by any single agent or even group of agents. Consequently, the university
has been publicly funded, and protected from the economic sphere. It is very important to
notice one other thing in this respect, which is that while the state was funding the uni-
versity, it was the university that was defining the nation or state, and not vice versa. The
university itself studied, and thereby defined the culture that was being promulgated, but
it also determined how that promulgation took place. Those funding the university had a
minimal role in directing it. This independence between the funding and the details of
the activities has been extremely important for the system as a whole.
This is a description of the universities until sometime in the middle of the twenti-
eth century. But since then, the university of culture has been disintegrating. The role of
the university is no longer to provide the next generation of good citizens. Part of the rea-
son is that this role builds and is built upon, a relatively strong presence of nation-states.
But as internationalization proceeds apace, the place of the nation-state recedes. We see
this economically in the rise of the trans-national corporation which have become of the
size of nations, and in international currency flows which are of the size of the GDP of
nations. We see this socially through large international migrations. And we see this in
the universities, particularly obviously in the “culture wars”, in which violent arguments,
particularly in the English-speaking world, erupted about the definition of the culture we
are studying. Fights over tradition and canon were essentially about the definition of “the
culture”, and the existence of these fights indicates that the existence of a culture that de-
fines a nation can no longer be taken for granted. The university of culture is no more.
There is an irony worth pointing out. One of the effects of the university of culture
was to facilitate and even drive a growth in national cohesion, which was particularly vis-
ible in Germany. Different regions within a nation, by exposure to the common cultural
tradition that was developed and promulgated through the national university system,
slowly converged, at least in their views of the cultural traditions. This opened the possi-
bility for, and indeed helped to create a form of national “social cohesion”. That phrase,
“social cohesion” is used deliberately, and anyone familiar with European Commission
Framework Programme documents, and even some of their tender documents, will rec-3
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       ognize it. One of the big issues within the Commission is creating cohesion across the dif-
ferent regions in Europe. As part of the published evaluation criteria for Framework
proposals, the contribution of the proposed project to social cohesion looms large. Just
when potentially a new role, in Europe at least, for the university of culture emerges, the
university of culture disappears.
So if the old role for the university has gone, and old university structures are crum-
bling, what exists now, or what will rise to take its place?
At this point I depart from Bill Readings and pursue a different tack. Readings view,
which seems quite perceptive to me, is that we are now living in the University of Excel-
lence, and he has insightful things to say about what that means.1 But I am going to turn
to innovation and innovation systems.
The linear model abdux2
In the bad old days innovation was viewed as a linear process, and was described using “the
linear model”. The general idea was that basic R&D provides the foundational knowledge
for applied R&D, which provides the foundational knowledge for innovation, which then
becomes a good to be diffused to users. The process is linear, with one stage feeding the
next, and it is uni-directional. On this model, the role of universities was clear. It was to
do the basic R&D, thereby providing the foundational knowledge, information, data, in-
strumentation and so on, on which the entire rest of the innovation edifice is built. In
terms of public goods, the role is also clear. Knowledge is a public good (Arrow, 1962;
Nelson, 1959) and so basic R&D, being the most widely applicable of all types of knowl-
edge, will be severely under-supplied by the market. Problems of extensibility and appro-
priation will deter firms from producing this type of knowledge. Given its importance to
the entire system, it had better be provided publicly. This is a very nice, simple model, in
which it is relatively easy to see the roles played by different actors and institutions, and it
has clear implications for research funding. As we proceed from basic R&D to diffusion,
1. One of the amusing things that Readings points out is that if you look at the public web pages
of universities you discover that they all describe themselves as unique. Interestingly, they are all
unique in exactly the same way: they are excellent. What it means to be excellent exactly is any-
one’s guess, and is pretty much up for grabs.
2. The history that follows here, while not a fiction, is meant to be rhetorical, rather than a
detailed account of the history of thought in the economics of innovation. For that, see for
example Rothwell (1992).4
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 the outputs become more and more appropriable, so there is less and less need for public
subsidy.
While the model has these desirable properties, it was also seen as having one or two
problematic aspects. First, it was difficult to find examples in which “pure” basic research
led directly to products (see for example Rosenberg, 1982, chapter 7), though nylon and
the laser are two favourites. Second, it was easy to find examples where most of the inno-
vations in an industry were made by the users, involving very little, if any, science at all
(see von Hippel, 1976, 1977, 1986). The first observation makes us wonder what basic
R&D is really doing in the context of an innovation system. The second observation im-
plies that in our model we need a feedback, a way for users to be putting information into
the process, rather than just using the outputs of it. So to our simple structure we should
add a link, or more than one, in which users are connected to other players, providing
them with information or knowledge inputs for their activities. But once you start adding
feedbacks to a model, any model, the temptation to add “just one more” it is hard to resist.
And soon emerged the system model of innovation. 
The system model of innovation, sometimes known as the National Innovation Sys-
tems model, emphasizes that there are many different types of actors or institutions which
contribute information or knowledge to the innovation process, and that information
flows in many directions between many different types of agents. In the this model, many
agents matter, and they matter in many ways. But if we say, with just a little bit of exag-
geration, that when thinking about innovation “everything matters”, it is quite natural to
ask, “Does anything matter more than anything else?”, or “Does everything, as input, mat-
ter for everything, as output?” One could argue that the system model of innovation has
seriously over-corrected the faults of the linear model. 
But be that as it may, we can still sensibly ask, if universities are part of the innova-
tion system what is their role within it? There is an obvious, and uncontroversial answer,
namely that the universities provide highly trained graduates. (If this is all they do, then
probably they should be transformed into vocational schools.) But if universities are linked
in many ways to many different entities in the system, surely they contribute in other ways
as well. The natural answer in its general form, is clearly that universities are a source of
knowledge and information (after all those are the main products of research) on which
other entities can build market-valued goods and services. And in this regard the systems
model is very similar to the linear model. Where it differs in a very important way is that
in the system model the university can take in knowledge and information from many dif-
ferent sources. In the original linear model by contrast, it appeared as if knowledge was5
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          generated in the universities without any inputs from the outside. In this regard, the sys-
tems model was a much better representation of university research (of which more be-
low). But pushing hard the line that universities are a source of knowledge an information
for other actors, the justification of the university system becomes the applicable knowl-
edge it feeds to innovators. 
In recent years, there has been considerable interest in what are called the science-
based industries. Biotechnology is the most prominent example. The claim is that inno-
vation and output in these industries depends heavily on very recent advances in (univer-
sity) basic research, and thus they provide the paradigm example of how universities
contribute to the innovation system. We see concern in policy-making circles, particularly
in Europe, to extend this vision to other industries as well.1 While this vision may apply
to some industries,2 it is important not to let the biotech tail wag the innovation system
dog.
Asking this question, and asserting as part of the answer that universities have a cru-
cial role, invites difficulties for the justification of public support for the university. The
reason is that by making a claim that universities are important players in a system of in-
novation, we are implicitly making the claim that the university has an economic role, and
thus its support can be justified by economic arguments. By emphasising that universities
play this role we move away from the cultural or social justification of the university, ar-
guing that it makes a strong contribution to wealth generation, and over time, the contri-
bution seems to be, in the arguments at least, more and more direct. We are inviting the
removal of the protection of universities from the economic sphere. And indeed, we are
getting what we asked for.3
The Bayh-Dole act is a perfect manifestation of the view that universities can con-
tribute very directly to wealth generation. The idea that there are lots of patentable, and
1. For evidence of just how much this is troubling EU policy makers, see the proceedings of the
conference The Europe of Knowledge 2020: A vision for university-based research and innovation,
Liege, April, 2004, in which an ever-present theme is how the university system will support
innovation in various industries and sectors in the coming decades. http://europa.eu.int/comm/
research/conferences/2004/univ/index_en.html
2. Though one is tempted to ask why biotech is not able to do the research in-house, merely by
hiring professors at large multiples of their academic salaries. Could it be that what biotech is
buying is not knowledge or research, but rather “independence” with which to impress regula-
tors? But perhaps such cynicism is best left undeveloped.
3. This rhetoric is certainly unfair, in that it reads as if the purveyors of the systems model of inno-
vation must take the credit or blame for the ongoing push towards the market. It is quite possi-
ble that this is a case rather, of seeing which way the wind is blowing, and bending with it.6
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      therefore marketable and economically valuable ideas lying around on lab benches makes
the university contribution to wealth creation almost as direct as it is possible to be. 
As central players in the innovation system universities provide inventions (which
they should patent, as a means of improving technology transfer from university to indus-
try), instrumentation, which is necessary for doing further, and probably more applied, re-
search, and they are providers of skilled labour, which industry can employ in its own
innovation activities. All of these are relatively direct contributions to the economy in gen-
eral, and to innovation in particular. The justification of the university here is as a creator
of wealth, if indirectly. But where is the public good? Technology transfer via the patent
system is by definition not a public good. The public good aspect remains the convention-
al one: the outputs of teaching and basic research.
The linear model redux
I want to propose that perhaps there is a simpler change to the linear model which, while
retaining its simplicity, addresses the two problems mentioned above, and will lead to a
slightly different view of the university’s role.1 It would remain a very stark model, missing
many features of an innovation system, but in its starkness and simplicity, it does permit
a certain focus, which can be difficult to obtain with more complex models. What I want
to propose is simply moving basic R&D to the end, rather than the beginning of the proc-
ess, and then adding a feedback, from the end to the beginning.
The ivory tower is not a windowless edifice. Scientists do look out its windows from
time to time, and what they see affects what they consider to be interesting problems. Pe-
ter Galison (2003) discusses the development of Einstein’s theories of relativity, and Ein-
stein’s concern with time and how we could know that events located at two distant points
in space happen at the same time. Galison argues that it is no coincidence that Einstein
was working on this at the moment at which railroads and cities (in Switzerland, and
Bern, near the patent office in particular) were developing technologies to coordinate their
clocks. It is also no coincidence that Poincaré was working on virtually the same problem,
independently of Einstein, just a few years earlier. He was, after all, in the Paris Bureau
of Longitude, for which one of the major challenges of the time was to find a way for sail-
1. I don’t mean, here, to suggest that the system model is wrong. There are typically many “right”
models of any given phenomenon. Models are made, not found, which means that given that
several right models can be constructed, the interesting issue becomes which one is most useful
in the circumstances. 7
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          ors to determine Paris time from anywhere in the world, so they could effectively measure
the longitude at their own location. Poincaré did not get to relativity, but his central con-
cern was the same as Einstein’s initial concern, namely what “simultaneity” means. Here
we see an example of some extremely theoretical basic research which was closely connect-
ed in inspiration at the least to developments in technology. This position more generally,
that science is not isolated from the “real world”, in a windowless ivory tower, is central in
recent sociology of science (see Barnes et al.,1996, for example for a recent text). While it
is true that the fundamental quest for science is the truth, there are very many possible true
statements or facts that could be pursued.1 Why this one rather than that one? How do
scientists decide what to investigate? In part at least, the answer is driven by the things
they observe in the world, whether it is technological developments, new industrial proc-
esses, or economic phenomena.
Rosenberg (1982, especially ch. 7) argues that a typical pattern is that basic research
follows technological or applied developments. The relationship between science and
technology is complex (certainly moreso than my simple revision of the linear model
would allow) but it is common that basic research serves to provide the theoretical expla-
nations of things that are already being used in practice. Phenomena observed in practice,
whether puzzling or just interesting, prompt scientists to look for the underlying physical
processes that explain them.2 Sometimes the phenomena are existing technological suc-
cesses which can be understood at a more general level; sometimes they are existing tech-
nological problems in the solving of which basic results are produced. In either case,
though, the direction of scientific or basic research is strongly affected by existing techno-
logical products. A big part of basic research picks up phenomena in the outside world,
sometimes natural, often man-made, and tries to explain them by asking about their fun-
damental underlying principles. 
This seems like a rather pessimistic view of university research. University scientists
here lag behind the “real world”, instead of leading it, and even so, they continue to engage
1. One can remain agnostic on the debate between realism and instrumentalism while making this
claim, simply observing that even if “truth” is defined differently under the two views of the sci-
entific enterprise (and even if some instrumentalists avoid the word “truth” altogether) searching
for it remains an objective regardless of the outcome of this debate. On these issues see Putnam
(1990 for example). 
2. Some of Rosenberg’s examples: short-wave radio transmission and properties of the ionosphere;
short circuits and whisker crystals; the properties of Bessemer and post-Bessemer produced
metals and metallurgy; aluminium alloys and “age hardening”; petroleum cracking and the gen-
eral effects of heat on hydrocarbons; semi-conductor use and semi-conductor theory.8
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           in navel gazing. Now their connection to the outside world is purely that it serves as a
source of navel lint.
But this interpretation is overly pessimistic, and misses one very important aspect.
A senior manager in charge of university relations at a major computer firm stated in con-
versation that his main goal in having professors visit his firm was try to raise their intel-
lectual curiosity about the types of developments the firm was involved in. He was
explicitly not trying to get them to solve his technical problems; he was trying to steer their
(basic) research interests. The value of the involvement of academics in a firm is not in
immediate product development, rather it lies in the future.
When a scientist does basic research, he or she is observing some phenomenon and
making a model of it. With a model, it is possible to extract the important, central features
and causal connections driving the phenomenon, and to understand “how it works”.
When the phenomenon is technological, as in several of Rosenberg’s examples, it can in-
volve the tacit knowledge of the practitioner. The process of basic research can be seen,
by extension, as tantamount to a process of codification.1 A phenomenon or process is de-
scribed in a compact, reproducible way in which its fundamental aspects are captured, and
secondary or unimportant features are set aside. In a completely new field codification in-
volves developing a vocabulary, models and a language in which the phenomena can be
described. Depending on whether the phenomenon fits into an existing field or is entirely
new, different activities receive more or less attention in this process, but all of them are
central to the abiility to teach the principles that are discovered.
What is being codified, typically, in the research process, is a causal structure that
explains some phenomenon. A phenomenon is typically broken into several pieces, and
then the pieces are linked. The research activity must decide first, what to consider as “a
piece”. There are a huge number of ways in which any thing can be partitioned, and the
partitioning into constituent components is utterly central to the enterprise. Then, of
course, the issue is how those pieces fit together, causally, to explain the observed effect.2
The reason I emphasize this has to do with causation. This is a tricky idea and many at-
tempts, beginning with Aristotle, have been made to provide a theory of it. One such at-
tempt seeks to connect the idea of causation with the idea of “control” or manipulability.3
That is, understanding the causes of a phenomenon implies understanding in principle
1. See Cowan and Foray (1997) or Cowan et al. (2000) on the economics and process of codifica-
tion.
2. Obviously, the partitioning and causal connection building are not independent activities.
3. See for example Collingwood (1940), Gasking (1955) or Menzies and Price (1993); or for a ver-
sion less dependent on human intervention, Pearl (2000).9
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          how to control it. While this remains a view that has some difficulties to be addressed, the
central idea indicates how basic research can be a powerful input into innovation. Inno-
vators are centrally interested in how to control processes. It is new-found control over
phenomena of that permits them to produce new products and processes. So causal mod-
els are indeed inputs to the innovation process, but, as Rosenberg and von Hippel would
argue, not as direct as this paragraph seems to suggest.
The route I will suggest comes through teaching. Once a phenomenon is under-
stood; once a causal model that explains it exists and has been codified, it can be taught.
The role of basic research is as an input to teaching. It permits universities to create grad-
uates who understand, at a relatively deep level, technologies, phenomena, processes that
have already been observed or created. That is, today’s graduates understand yesterday’s
innovations. And they understand them not only in the purely pragmatic way that inter-
ests the entrepreneur (if I do X, there is an effect Y, which can be translated into higher
productivity or better product), but they also understand why X produces Y. They are not
taught, and this is important to acknowledge, how to turn Y into higher profits. This is
an extremely important difference between an entrepreneur and a scientist. Scientists are
attracted or driven by “interesting phenomena” and not by “interesting market opportu-
nities”.1 This observation of the difference between academics and entrepreneurs consti-
tutes a strong reason for scepticism regarding the view that universities can be a source of
directly applicable knowledge for innovators.
The fact that today’s graduates understand yesterday’s innovations is not the prob-
lem it sounds like, since today’s graduates, or at least those of them who escape the uni-
versity, will be tomorrow’s innovators. Their innovations will build on their knowledge,
and their understanding of how things work. This is the reason it may be more apposite
to speak of highly qualified rather than highly trained personnel, as the latter implies a
strong degree of vocational skills, while the former connotes a heavier emphasis on general
skills. The ability to be a successful innovator depends on levels of general understanding,
that is, the understanding that comes from the outputs of basic research. But again it is
worth emphasising that the results students are being taught are not of the “with a little
refinement this theorem will become a product” variety. It is far more general than that. 
The conclusion here is disappointingly conventional. The role of universities is to
couple research and teaching. The output is highly qualified personnel. The human cap-
ital embodied in graduates is not highly specific, and is in fact general enough that it con-
1. This can be interpreted as one of the reasons why the technology-push model was replaced by
the demand-pull model, to use Rothwell’s (1992) terminology.10
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      stitutes a public good, or at least without labour contracts that are tantamount to
indentured servitude, a non-appropriable good.
Innovation ignored
Is there something beyond this disappointingly conventional conclusion about the place
of the university? Does the university do more than simply analyse today’s phenomena and
teach the results of that analysis to tomorrow’s innovators? I believe the answer is yes, or
at least has been yes, but that the recent emphasis given to the university as a player in the
innovation system threatens that activity.
The activity I refer to is “reflection”. The university is the only place in modern so-
ciety in which non-teleological reflection is institutionalized. Part of the role of the uni-
versity has been to provide a location in which members of the society could reflect on
what the society is doing, to discuss any issue thought pressing, without reference to any
outside constraints or goals. It provided a place for thought that was insulated both from
the political process and from the market. It was a place in which the phrase “Let’s stop
and think.” was a sort of a trump card. Any issue can be worthy of careful, deliberate, un-
rushed discussion and analysis, and the university was a place in which this activity was
revered. This idea, that somewhere, someone should be able to resist any pressures to treat
an issue either quickly, or with a particular frame of reference, or even with a particular
outcome in mind, was considered a fundamental part of a well-functioning society, and
was built into the university ethos.
What goes hand in hand with this is a concern for truth. In the university setting,
in principle, the truth trumps everything. When faced with a choice between action mo-
tivated by truth, either seeking it or acting upon it, and action driven by some other mo-
tive, the former is lexicographically preferred. Obviously, people can be mistaken about
the truth, believing things that are not in fact true. But within the university setting, this
is not an issue. Pursuit of, and statements about beliefs of truth are meant to be the dom-
inant currency. There is no other institution in society in which this is the case.1 And it
seems patently obvious to me at least, that this is a valuable function.
1. One might make a claim that the monasteries perform or did perform this function. As such
they bear similarities to universities: one could argue that monestaries were the preserve of those
who glorify the god Yahweh, whereas universities are the preserve of those who glorify their own
god, namely consistency.11
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      But the insertion of the university into the innovation system, and thereby into the
market sphere is seriously threatening this role. It introduces a second, and growingly im-
portant, criterion on desideratum for action, namely the economic effects or value of it. If
a university is passing things to the “outside world” it must be aware of what its “clients”
want, and at some level, deliver it to them. This has always been true to some extent, even
in Readings’ University of Culture, since there the universities were delivering a social co-
hesion which the state (funding the universities) wanted. But notice that this is a demand
specified in very general terms, and in fact the universities determined the details of how
and what was delivered. When the demands becomes more specific, clients have a louder
voice in the what and how. 
The pressure of the market means that even that most “ethereal” of departments,
namely philosophy, is now offering courses to appeal to the market, for example in med-
ical ethics. One could make the case that this is not necessarily bad, and that many people
outside academe need now to be able to think carefully and effectively about such issues,
so this pressure on philosophy departments could constitute a very important contribution
to society. But there are other cases which cannot be explained away like this. They are
emblematic, it seems, of the thought that the market has no interest whatsoever, except
possibly instrumentally, in the truth. Two recent high publicity cases at the University of
Toronto make the point. In the year 2000, David Healy was appointed as the Professor
of Psychiatry and Head of the Mood and Anxiety Disorders Program within CAMH
(Center for Addiction and Mental Health). The offer was formally made and accepted.
In August, he gave a lecture in Toronto in which he discussed, among other things, the
idea that serotonin re-uptake inhibitors could contribute to suicidal tendencies. This was
not a new idea of his, he had published papers and lectured on it many times in the past.
Within days, his appointment was rescinded. Of course no one knows exactly why this
was done, so it may just be a coincidence that half1 of the funding of the mood disorders
program at CAMH came from pharmaceutical companies.2
The second case in Toronto involved Dr. Nancy Olivieri, former head of the Sick
Children’s Hospital’s haemoglobinopathy programme. Her research on the drug de-
feriprone showed up unexpected side-effects, so she decided to break a confidentiality
1. As reported by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.
2. In a similar, earlier case, Healy had written an article published by the Hastings Institute, in
which he warned of possible problems with SSRIs, and produced evidence that an increasing
proportion of the therapeutics literature was ghost-written (Healy 2000). It turned out that
Lilly was one of the biggest private funders of the Hastings Center and following this article
they withdrew their support. For more on these cases see http://www.healyprozac.com/Aca-
demicFreedom/default.htm12
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              agreement with Apotex, the Toronto pharmaceutical company that was sponsoring her
research, tell her patients, and publish the results in the New England Journal of Medicine
(Olivieri et al., 1998). She was subsequently threatened with legal action by Apotex, and
what is more astonishing, removed from her hospital post by the university. Naturally, this
caused quite a stir, but the report on the affair observed, among other things, that this lack
of independence of researchers was no longer uncommon. In other (quite ugly) words, in-
dustry sponsors of research appear now to be attempting to buy the results they want, or
at least suppress the results they don’t want.1 And in doing so they seem to be able to dic-
tate university policy.2
The ability to put truth at the head of the list of motivations, and the ability to pause
and reflect, are both seriously threatened by the universities’ having been pushed towards
the market. What it points to is a very difficult issue. In order to protect these aspects of
university culture, it must be the case that research (and indeed other university activity)
is to a very great extent independent of funding sources. Of course this makes justification
of university activity extremely difficult, since funders naturally ask, “What are we getting
for our money?” and demand, “Show that our money is not being wasted”. If funders feel
they should have a loud voice in determining university activity, it is naturally quite easy
for them to see waste, in activities that do not directly further their aims. If funding agen-
cies, whether public or private, are assured that universities will make great contributions
to an innovation system, and funding is based on this argument, then activities that do not
respond directly to that goal, are waste. Activities that have the nature I have been describ-
ing in this section will almost automatically fall in this category.
Conclusion
I stated at the outset that universities have always provided some public good, and this was
how they justified public support. On the model described by Humbolt, which survived
through most of the modern period, universities provided a steady stream of “good citi-
zens”. Their value showed in their ability to administer the nation as a nation, integrate
with existing enterprise to promote the national economy, and in their ability, and indeed
affinity to support and further its cultural identity. Social cohesion was an important pub-
1. Olivieri was eventually reinstated to her post, and otherwise vindicated (Spurgeon, 1999).
2. It may only be coincidence that both of these cases involve medicine, and in particular pharma-
ceutical research. But if not, this may be another reason for fearing the biotech tail of the inno-
vation dog.13
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    lic effect. In the early twentieth century, universities provided a large cadre of highly ed-
ucated labour. On the back of this labour tremendous economic growth and social change
was built. Again it was an output that due to its nature was non-appropriable. What is the
public good of the future? I have argued above that again it is a body of highly qualified
personnel. Again, as graduates they are not “trained” as they would be in a vocational
school, but rather educated in the broad sense. Vocational training can in principle be
made a club good, but education remains a public good, due to labour mobility. Adopting
this model or view, especially in the European context, we open the door to the redistri-
bution of human capital. If the labour mobility is across borders, so too is the redistribu-
tion. This will break down further the national identities that were such an important part
of the German university model. On the other hand, it provides a route to create the Holy
Grail of the EU Framework programmes, and possibly of the European project itself,
namely “social cohesion”.1 But notice that this does not follow the model of the University
of Culture, in that the goal here is not to find some European literary tradition, or on the
American model a literary canon, through which to create and then pass on a cultural tra-
dition. One suspects that the cultures are too diverse. This suggests a shift from the hu-
manities to the social sciences as the intellectual centre of the university. Here it may be
possible to find more, broader-based cohesion.
In terms of “channelling knowledge” my argument seems to come to the following
conclusions. The systems model was right: knowledge does flow into the university re-
search environment. It does so by scientists observing interesting phenomena, and asking
how they work. Industry can provide a lot of this observation, and in doing so, interest the
university scientist in phenomena that industry perhaps uses, but does not understand.
But this is definitely not a new way of saying that universities can solve problems that in-
dustry is having. Rather, universities are codifying things that industry either does not un-
derstand, or only knows tacitly. Here is the public good, which does serve to help the
innovation system, though in a very general way: the university produces basic, public
knowledge, and a stream of graduates who understand it.
Where does this leave reflection and truth? On this model of the university’s role,
they are restored to, or perhaps supported in their rightful place. Because industry, or the
1. The Commission does seem to be aware of this. It is actively trying to foment social cohesion
through universities and research institutes. This is most obvious at the level of the (senior)
researcher, through Framework Programme evaluation procedures, but it exists as well at the
level of graduate students and post-docs through various Marie Curie activities. It is very much
weaker at the undergraduate level, which is probably the most important level of the three. But
perhaps the Bologna Accord is a step in that direction.14
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 external innovation system in general is not a “client” of the university, the latter does not
need to produce something that industry wants to buy. The question “What is the market
value of this activity?” again recedes in the university sphere, and can be replaced by “Is it
true? Let’s stop and think.”
 15
 Cowan
 
  
 
Universities
                                       References
Arrow, K. J. (1962) “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Innovation”, 
in: The Rate and Direction of Technical Change, R. Nelson, (Ed.), New York, 
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Barnes, B., Bloor, D, and J. Henry (1996) Scientific Knowledge: A sociological analysis, 
Chicago, Chicago University Press.
Collingwood, R. (1940) An Essay on Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Cowan, R., P. David and D. Foray (2000) “The Explicit Economics of Knowledge Cod-
ification and Tacitness” Industrial and Corporate Change, vol. 9(2): 211-253.
Cowan, R. and D. Foray (1997) “The Economics of Codification and the Diffusion of 
Knowledge”, Industrial and Corporate Change, vol. 6: 595-622.
Galison, P. (2003) Einstein’s Clocks, Poincaré’s Maps: Empires of Time, New York, Norton.
Gasking, D. (1955) “Causation and Recipes”, Mind, 64, pp. 479-487.
Healy, D. (2000). “Good Science or Good Business?” Hastings Center Report 30: 19-22
Menzies, P. and Price, H. (1993) “Causation as a Secondary Quality”, British Journal for 
the Philosophy of Science, 44: 187-203.
Nelson, R. (1959) “The Simple Economics of Basic Research.” Journal of Political Econ-
omy 67:297-306.
Olivieri N.F., G.M. Brittenham, C.E. McLaren, D.M. Templeton, R.G. Cameron, 
R.A. McClelland, A.D. Burt, K.A. Fleming  (1998) “Long-term safety and effec-
tiveness of iron-chelation therapy with deferiprone for thalassemia major” New  
England Journal of Medicine. vol. 339(7):417-23.
Pearl, J. (2000) Causality. New York: Cambridge University Press, New York.
Putnam, H. (1990) Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge MA, Harvard University 
Press.
Readings, B. (1996) The University in Ruins, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
Rosenberg, N. (1982) Inside the Black Box: Technology and Economics, Cambridge, Cam-
bridge University Press.
Rothwell, R. (1992) “Successful industrial innovation: critical factors for the 1990s”, 
R&D Management, vol. 22(3).
David Spurgeon (1999) “Toronto research funding dispute” BMJ vol. 318:351.
von Hippel, E. (1976) “The Dominant Role of Users in the Scientific Instrument Inno-
vation Process,” Research Policy 5(3): 212-39.
von Hippel, E. (1977) “The Dominant Role of the User in Semiconductor and Elec-
tronic Subassembly Process Innovation,” IEEE Transactions on Engineering Man-
agement EM-24(2): 60-71.
Von Hippel, E. (1986) “Lead users: A source of novel product concepts,” Management 
Science 32: 791-806.16
 Cowan
 
  
 
Universities
 17
